What Happened?

On October 30, 2024, a security flaw was detected in Okta’s AD/LDAP Delegated Authentication (DelAuth) service. This issue, linked to how cache keys were generated using Bcrypt, could potentially allow authentication bypasses when specific criteria were met. Under precise conditions, a user might authenticate by supplying a username 52 characters or more that corresponded with a cache key from a previous successful login.

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This flaw impacted Okta AD/LDAP DelAuth from July 23, 2024, until the fix was applied in production on October 30, 2024.

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Conditions for Exploitation

Exploitation of this vulnerability was only feasible when all of the following conditions were present:

• The organization was using Okta’s AD/LDAP DelAuth.
• No Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was enabled.
• The username was 52 characters or more.
• An earlier login by the user had been cached.
• The cached data was used instead of fresh authentication, which can occur if the AD/LDAP agent is unavailable due to high load or connectivity issues.

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Resolution

On October 30, 2024, Okta switched from Bcrypt to PBKDF2 for cache key generation, effectively addressing the vulnerability.

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Recommended Actions

If your organization relies on AD/LDAP DelAuth and meets the described conditions, it is recommended you take the following actions:

1. Log Review: Investigate Okta System Logs for any unexpected authentications involving usernames over 52 characters between July 23 and October 30, 2024.
2. Enable MFA: Ensure that MFA is in place for all users.
3. Adopt Phishing-Resistant Options: Consider enrolling users in advanced, phishing-resistant methods, such as Okta Verify FastPass, FIDO2 WebAuthn, or similar authenticators, to improve security.